INTRODUCTION

On August 2010, the US Department of Defense released its annual report on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China”. The report concludes that PLA acquisition of capabilities relevant to ROC continues without any reduction; deployments of advanced weapons opposite the island have not decreased; and the military balance continuous to shift in PRC favor.

It judges that PRC is building up capabilities in the service of three strategic objectives: to deter Taiwanese to declare de jure independence; to influence Taipei to settle on Beijing’s terms; and to deter, delay, or deny possible U.S. support for ROC in case of conflicting with PRC, therefore, PRC seeks to enhance its options and to restrict those of ROC and the United States at the same time.

What are the implications of these developments? First, ROC needs to continue to strengthen its military capabilities of deterrence. Second, the United States should continue to sell arms to ROC to help it build that deterrence and reduce the ROC people’s sense of vulnerability and anxiety.

In other words, ROC must continue to enhance its military strength and capabilities. This concerns, first of all, the procurement of appropriate advanced equipment, which we all understand is a complex subject. Second, it requires a feasible defense strategy. This too is complicated because ROC cannot assure absolutely that the United States will come to its defense and plan accordingly. But, military planners of both sides need to think of what ROC military power can do to maximize the effect of U.S. intervention should it come on the basis of legal and legitimate reasons.

Therefore, ROC must have a strong relationship with the United States. If only because the United States is a central element of ROC defense strategy, it is important that Washington policy makers remain confident that ROC strategic intentions are closely aligned with the strategic intentions of the United States.

CHALLENGES

The U.S. military capabilities to project power into the Asia-Pacific Region, once unchallenged, is now threatened by the emergence of what Pentagon planners refer to as PLA “anti-access/area-denial” strategy. The goal of the PLA anti-access strategy is not to match U.S. ship-for-ship and plane-for-plane but rather to develop certain specialized capabilities designed to make it difficult for U.S. forces to operate freely anywhere close to PRC coasts.

In the past decade, Beijing has made considerable progress toward achieving this goal. Everyone of the relative handful of bases on which the United States relies to sustain its presence in the Western Pacific Region will soon be within range of bombardment by repeated attacks of precisely targeted PRC conventional ballistic and cruise missiles. At the same time, the PLA is in the process of building up a network of satellites, onshore radars and other sensors that will enable it to locate and track an enemy’s surface ships hundreds of miles off its coasts and then use a combination of torpedoes, high-speed cruise missiles and land-based ballistic missiles to sink or disable them.

The U.S. aircraft carriers are the main platforms to its global power-projection capabilities. In the future conflict, Washington might have little choice but to pull them far back from China’s coasts, well beyond the effective range of the PLA operations. This would dramatically jeopardize their ability to provide air defense for U.S. friends or to conduct strikes against PLA forces on land or at sea. In addition to those threats, the PLA is experimenting with anti-satellite weapons and techniques for taking down computer networks, thereby causing enemy deaf and blind during the critical opening phases of a war.

Furthermore, the PLA Navy is turning out attack submarines at a record pace and developing sophisticated undersea mines; it is in the process of completing a massive new submarine base near to the South China Sea, and has reportedly begun to deploy an undersea detection system that would aid it in engaging U.S. submarines operating off its shores. Finally, PRC is investing heavily in hiding or hardening critical facilities and in advanced radars and surface to air missiles, including some that may be effective against ”stealthy” US aircraft and cruise missiles.

This combination of rapidly advancing offensive and defensive capabilities is beginning to raise doubts in the Asia-Pacific Region about U.S. capabilities and intentions to defend its allies and project its power. What is worse, over the next several years there will be an increasing danger that PRC leaders might believe that they have a chance of starting a war by effectively knocking the United States out of the Western-Pacific region and blunting its initial, retaliatory response, all without striking the American homeland and without the need to fire a single nuclear weapon.

In addition, the near-term forces of PRC military modernization effort, including its air force, navy and strategic ballistic missile force, have been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan straits. Consistent with this goal, the PLA wants its military to be capable of acting as an anti-access force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan straits, or failing them, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air force.

OPPORTUNITIES

Asia-Pacific Region possesses plentiful offshore assets that enable the United States to maintain a viable military presence, to contend with a rising China and to maintain a favorable balance of power. The U.S. alliance with Japan and its close strategic partnership with South Korea, Australia, and Singapore provide Washington with key naval and air facilities essential to regional power projection. The United States also has developed strategic cooperation with Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Each country possesses significant port facilities that can contribute to U.S. capabilities during periods of heightened tensions, whether it is over the South China Sea, Taiwan straits or Korea peninsula.

The United States developed and sustained its strategic partnerships with East Asia’s maritime countries and maintained the balance of power both during and after the cold war because of its overwhelming naval superiority. The U.S. military power projection capability has assured U.S. strategic partners that they can depend on the United States to deter another great power from attacking them.

Currently, the critical factor in assessing the modernization of the PLA military forces is whether PRC is on the verge of challenging U.S. deterrence and developing war winning capabilities to such a degree that East Asia’s countries would question the value of their strategic alignment with the United States.

As ROC and PRC continue their rapprochement, some strategic planners in Washington will be tempted to reduce further arms sales to Taiwan out of the calculation that the potential for conflict is low and that arms sales will only offend Beijing. But, in addition to remaining faithful to the Taiwan Relation Act, arms sales are exactly the kind of positive inducements Washington can provide to ROC for its responsible engagement of cross-strait relations, especially as PRC military deployments continue expanding despite the improvement of cross-strait relations. Moreover, arms sales have an importance beyond their military utility; they demonstrate a strong U.S. commitment and credibility to democratic Taiwan.

U. S. efforts to contribute to ROC self-defense should also evolve to reflect the challenges posed by PRC continuing military modernization and build up. U.S. assistant Secretary of Defense Chip Gregson has called for ROC military to seek out areas of asymmetric advantages, explaining that “asymmetry will not replace a layered defense or defeat PRC force, but it can deter them from fully employing the advanced weapons they are developing and undermine their effectiveness”. He has called for maneuverable weapons system that makes use of deception and camouflage, and the strengthening of ROC defense. In other words, though the current commitments for arms sales should be maintained, further sales agreements should be concluded with an asymmetric strategy in mind.

Achieving asymmetric capabilities requires more than simply purchasing new weapons. It involves developing new doctrine and tactics aimed at undermining PLA anti-access strategy and exploring its vulnerabilities. Addressing these issue is a long-term problem that deserves long-term analysis and close consultation. ROC military’s next QDR should be released in 2013, which gives Taipei and Washington plenty of time to establish a joint analysis group to plan for ROC defense strategy in light of financial, political, and military realities. The United States should push for the establishment of such a group and emphasis on enhancing asymmetric capabilities in ROC military strategy for the purpose of neutralizing PLA anti-access strategy.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The persistent question for U.S. decision makers in the military, Administration, and Congress is whether the United States would go to war with the PRC over Taiwan. The question of U.S. assistance for the ROC defense involves three aspects: political commitment, strategic interests, and military capability to assist ROC self-defense.

The Taiwan Relation Act did not replace the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 that ended in 1979. Nonetheless, some have called for a clear commitment to show up deterrence and help ROC self-defense, advanced arms sales, interoperability with ROC military, combined operational training and planning, high-level meetings, and visits by U.S. flag and general officers to Taipei. Others have argued that the United States should avoid a war with PRC and needs a cooperative PRC to address a number of global problems and that the United States should reconsider arms sales to ROC. Another option would be to limit U.S. assistance to arms sales and related transfers while not committing U. S. forces.

On February 27, 2006, former president Chen announced that he would terminate the National Unification Council and raised question about new tension with PRC. US Senator John Warner told PACOM Commander Admiral William Fallon, at a hearing on March 7, 2006 that “if conflict were precipitated by just inappropriate and wrongful politics generated by the Taiwanese elected officials, I am not entirely sure that this nation would come full force to their rescue if they created that problem”.

After Ma Ying-jeou became President in May 2008, he resumed cross-strait dialogue for the first time in a decade and pursued closer economic and cultural engagement with the PRC. Aside from contrasting with the cross-strait tension under his predecessor who was perceived as pushing for Taiwan’s de jure independence, President Ma declared that ROC will continue to purchase U.S. weapons, while ROC will “never ask American to fight for Taiwan”. In addition to stating this point in a reporter’s interview, President Ma reiterated this policy position in an attempt to assure visiting Senator Dianne Feinstein in June 2010.

The dynamic of cross-strait interactions have positive and negative implications for U.S. interest and military deployment in Asia-Pacific region. Some strategic planners inside the Pentagon have asked a question of whether Taiwan’s pursuit of closer interactions with the PRC has an implication of ROC strategic reorientation away from the United States. In particular, greater cross-strait interactions have raised concerns about the leakage of military technologies, intelligence, and other secrets from Taiwan to mainland China, thus jeopardizing the integrity of U.S. defense technology that has already been transferred to Taiwan.

In other words, a constructive engagement with the PRC under President Ma Ying-jeou since May 2008 has raised an issue among some observers of whether the United States should review U.S. military strategy toward PRC and ROC. Specifically, the main focus of debate is on the relative importance of a “balance of power” versus “peace and stability” in the U.S. strategic objective in the Asia-Pacific region.

And I would suggest that a better defined military strategy to set clear objectives and improve mutual consensus between U.S. and ROC might be needed in order to effectively counter PLA anti-access strategy.

（本文僅供參考，不代表本會立場）

（原稿99.11.02發表於國防部國際戰略研討會）