In the last four decades, Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore had experienced rapid economic growth. Schumpeter(1911) had emphasized the importance of the banking system in economic growth and highlighted circumstances when financial institutions could actively spur innovation and future growth by identifying and funding productive investments. In addition, many economists also showed that the development of financial institutions was essential for economic growth (see, for example, Gurley and Shaw(1955), Patrick(1966), Goldsmith(1969), Mckinnon(1973), Shaw(1973), Levine(1991), King and Levine(1993a,b), Pagano(1993), and Beck et al.(2000) among others). However, they neglected the effect of international capital mobility on economic growth. High degree of capital mobility not only affects independence of domestic monetary and fiscal policies, but also adds to complexity of managing saving and investment problems in a country. This paper will emphasize the role of financial development and structure (including banking and stock markets), monetary and financial policies, as well as the degree of international capital mobility in the economic growth processes. We will examine how these elements may affect the economic growth in these countries by utilizing the generalized method of moments (GMM) to a framework of endogenous growth model.
Keywords: financial development; economic growth; international capital mobility; GMM (generalized method of moments).
I. Introduction
In the last two decades, Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore had experienced remarkable growth with an annual average growth rate of over 6%. It is interesting to examine the sources of economic growth in these economies. Until the Asian Crisis happened, the importance of financial development and stability had been ignored.
The general idea that economic growth is related to financial development and structure can go back at least to Schumpeter (1911). Schumpeter emphasized the importance of the banking system in economic growth and highlighted circumstances when financial institutions can actively spur innovation and future growth by identifying and funding productive investments. Earlier recent literature including Goldsmith(1969), McKinnon(1973) and Shaw(1973) had suggested that financial system have played an important role in economic growth. McKinnon(1973) and Shaw(1973) showed that financial development would raise saving, capital accumulation, and hence economic growth. More recent empirical studies such as Greenwood and Jovanoic(1990), Bencivenga and Smith(1991), King and Levine(1993a, b), and Beck et al. (2000) had also shown that a range of financial indicators are robustly positively correlated with economic growth. Demetrides and Hussein(1996) employed time series data for each of 16 countries showed that finance is a leading sector in the process of economic development. Also, Odedokun(1996) employed time series data for 71 developing countries and showed financial intermediation promotes economic growth, in some 85% of the countries. But, King and Levine(1993b) also found that government intervention in the financial system has a negative effect on the growth rate.
Levine(1991), Saint-Paul(1992) and Bencivenga et al.(1995) showed that stock market accelerate growth by allowing agents to diversify portfolios and facilitating the ability to trade ownership of firms without disrupting the productive processes occurring within firms. However, Bencivenga et al.(1995) also showed that financial development can hurt economic growth. Specifically, financial development by enhancing resource allocation and hence the returns to saving may lower saving rates. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine(1996b) used 44 cross-countries data from 1986 through 1993 had found that a positive relationship between stock market and financial institutions development. Levine and Zervos (1998) investigated whether measures of stock market liquidity, size, volatility, and integration with world capital markets are correlated with economic growth. Their study provided empirical evidence on the theoretical debates regarding the linkages between stock markets and long-run economic growth. However, their study did not utilize time series model to test the growth relation in a particular country. Instead, they used 47 countries data from 1976 though 1993 by taking the standard cross-country growth regression framework like Barro (1991) to test the economic growth hypothesis. Arestis et al.(2000) used quarterly data and applied time series model to five developed economies and showed that while both banking sector and stock market development explain subsequent growth, the effect of banking sector development is substantially larger than that of stock market development.
Hsu and Lin(2000) had investigated the relation between long-run economic growth and financial development and to see whether stock market and financial institutions promote economic growth using Taiwan's data from 1964 through 1996. The empirical method utilized is the vector autoregressive error-correction model proposed by Johansen and Juselius (1992). They showed that both banking and stock market development are positively related with short-run and long-term economic growth. In particular, the financial depth measured by the ratio of the broad monetary aggregate (M2) and GDP has strong effect on the output growth. In addition, they also found that the causality between financial development measures and economic development occurred during the study period (i.e. from 1964 through 1996).
However, among the empirical studies of economic growth, they neglected the effect of international capital mobility on economic growth. High degree of capital mobility not only affects independence of domestic monetary and fiscal policies, but also adds to complexity of managing saving and investment problems in a country.
Hanson(1994) suggested that a stable macroeconomy and domestic financial liberalization to a significant degree are preconditions to international financial liberalization. Johnston et al. (1997) examined issues in sequencing and pacing capital account liberalization and draws lessons from experience in Chile, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. Their results suggested that capital account liberalization should be approached as an integrated part of comprehensive reform strategies and should be paced with the implementation of appropriate macroeconomic and exchange rage policies. However, Kim and Suh(1998) suggested that capital account liberalization will enhance the competitiveness and efficiency of financial transactions for Korean corporations. Hence, It cannot further delay the opening of domestic capital market to foreigners as well as the foreign capital markets to domestic residents.
The purpose of this paper is to review the evolution of Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore’s financial policy and to examine the relation between financial development and the source of growth in each country. This paper will emphasize the role of financial development and structure (including banking and stock markets), monetary and financial policies, as well as the degree of international capital mobility in the economic growth processes. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the evolution of each country’s financial system. Section III describes an econometric model and the data. Section IV presents the main results. Section V is the concluding remarks.
II. Evolution of the Financial System
2.1 The Taiwan Financial Liberalization Process
For the past two decades, the Taiwan, Korean and Singapore economies had experienced remarkable growth with an annual growth rate of over 6%.
The Taiwan government controlled the financial liberalization process very tightly. Liberalization in the financial sector changes gradually. Financial liberalization took place in three stages since 1980. Slow financial liberalization allows Taiwan to be free from the serious attack of the Asian financial crisis. In particular, the incomplete deregulation of the capital account, i.e. the control of the portfolio investment inflows, as well as the low reliance on hard-currency-denominated foreign loans in the private sector were two key factors to allow the Taiwan economy to fight against the hard-type financial investment of foreign funds.
The financial liberalization process in Taiwan could be divided in three stages. Firstly, interest rate liberalization started in the early 1980s. Deregulation of the interest rate ceiling on the money market was effective in November 1980. And from March 1985 banks were allowed to price their own interest rates.
Secondly, the foreign exchange system was converted from a fixed rate system to a managed flexible rate system in February 1979. Although the exchange rate of the NT dollar against the US dollar has been allowed to fluctuate since then, it is controlled occasionally by the Central Bank. Also, the Central Bank had controlled the capital movement quite closely until July 1987, when it deregulated capital outflow in the non-bank private sector. However, the bank's borrowing of foreign exchange was frozen.
Thirdly, the liberalization of the securities market started in January 1988, when the Securities and Exchange Law was revised to lift the restriction of the establishment of new securities companies. However, the participation of foreign investors in the Taiwan securities market is allowed to increase gradually. This slow increase in the foreign investment in the domestic stock market did not completely separate the Taiwan capital market from the global financial markets. However, this conservative liberalization policy together with the partial deregulation of capital movement allowed the Taiwan economy to be secure from the speculative attack of the foreign hedge and mutual funds. In sum, the financial liberalization process in Taiwan during the last two decades followed the order suggested by McKinnon (1991) to transform the economy from a financial control economy to a market-oriented one. The Taiwan government had designed a series of financial account or capital account control to stave off the speculative attack on currency and the financial market. The main regulations on capital flows could be summarized as follows.
1. Taiwanese banks are not allowed to borrow abroad freely. Usually they should report in advance at the beginning of each year to the Central Bank to explain their yearly schedule of foreign borrowing and debt balances.
2. The Central Bank banned the use of non-delivery forward contracts（NDFs）for Taiwanese corporations to hedge against the foreign exchange risks.
3. In the equity and securities market, the maximum investment quota for each qualified foreign institutional investor is ＄600 million US dollar before November 1999. Now it is raised to ＄2 billion US dollars.
4. Each offshore natural person is limited to invest a maximum of ＄5 million US dollars, while each offshore juridical person or each non-incorporated fund is limited to invest a maximum of ＄50 million.
2.2 The Korea Financial Liberalization Process
The financial liberalization policies in Korea were to give financial institutions greater freedom to set their own prices and to attract and allocate funds, during the 1980s. Major policies implemented during the first half of 1980s include the privatization of commercial banks in 1982-1983; the reduction of entry barriers to nonblank financial intermediaries; more diversification of financial services provided by different financial intermediaries in 1982-1983; various interest rate deregulations (1982-1984) including the abolition of preferential interest rates (1982); and the internationalization of capital markets (1981-85). Extensive deregulation of interest rates of banks and nonblank financial intermediaries in 1988 resulted in the liberalization of most of the lending rates, interest rates on money and capital markets, and partial liberalization of the interest rates on deposits (see Kim and Suh (1998)). Three new commercial banks were established in 1989, five securities investment companies were set up in that year, and 18 life insurance companies were opened during 1987-1990.
However continued government control of interest rates at all banks, along with high proportion of nonperforming bank loans and heavy dependence on the Bank of Korea for low-cost funds to support their outstanding loans, had left the privately owned commercial banks very vulnerable. A substantial of their outstanding loans had been still policy-related. The banks cannot afford to ignore the government’s suggestions, despite their shift to private ownership (see Smith (2000)). State allocation of credit remained little changed after financial liberalization in 1980s.
The nonblank financial institutions, in contrast, had always been privately owned and had been both less controlled and less protected by the government. They had to mobilize their own funds in competitive markets and to earn enough on their loans and investments to cover the cost of their funds. A combination of lax government supervision, unreliable accounting statements, and high growth had avoided and postponed serious problems before the Asian Financial Crises in 1997. This is especially true for finance companies and merchant banks.
The financial liberalization in Korea during the 1990s was due to its effort to join the OECD. The global integration of the economy accelerated in 1993, in an effort to meet the requirements to join the OECD. The capital account liberalization in Korea since 1990 had induced capital inflows, as the fall in world real interest rates in 1989 pushed capital to flow to Asia. The portfolio net inflows to Korea between 1990 and mid-1997 totaled US$ 59 billion. In the previous seven years, net inflows had totaled roughly zero (see Hanna(2000)). It is showed be noted that while there is conflicting debate surrounding the distribution of blame for the Asian Financial Crises in Korea during 1997-1998, there is a general consensus that its root cause lay in the country’s high-debt model of economic development, as well as poor sequencing of financial market liberalization. In 1994, Korean authorities liberalized restrictions on short-term foreign borrowing by financial institutions and corporates, but retained controls on long-term borrowing. Subsequently, the time profile of Korea’s foreign debt shortened significantly.
2.3 Singapore’s Financial Structure
The importance of Singapore’s financial services sector in the overall economy has been rising over the past decades, with the average share of the sector increasing from 9% in the 1980s to 12% of real GDP in 1991-2001. The average annual growth rate was 14.2% during 1980-1990 and 7.6% during 1991-2001. The recent implementation of liberalization measures announced in 1998 has brought about changes to the composition of activity in the financial services sector.
The Singapore’s financial services sector comprises four segments, (i.e. banking, insurance, investment advisory, and stock broking), which accounted for nearly 77% of segments, banking and insurance, generated nearly 63% of the average annual value-added in 1997-2001. The banking segment can be further disaggregated into ACU (Asian Currency Units) and commercial banking. The share of insurance rose from 14.5% in 1991-96 to 18.3% in 1997-2001, while the share of the stock market segment was at around 10% in both periods.
The financial system is dichotomized in Singapore by separating domestic banking units from the offshore financial center. The offshore financial center is composed of Asian Currency Units (ACUs). The ACU is not currency units like the ECU of Eurodollar market and thus should not be interpreted as demarcated financial market. It is an offshore banking branch of a domestic bank and deals with nonlocal currency, generally with very little regulation and primarily but not exclusively for nonresidents. Thus, an ACU can deal in any currency except the Singapore dollar. In Taiwan, it is called OBU (offshore banking unit). The DBU (domestic banking unit) and ACU are simply accounting conventions for financial legal entities established within financial institutions and registered to operate according to specific guidelines laid down by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS).
The main idea of developing Singapore as a financial center is just to do offshore business, not to develop Singapore’s domestic business. The dichotomized financial system could insulate the economy against external shocks, like the global stock crash of 1987 and the 1997 Asian currency turmoil. However, there are no capital controls and no foreign exchange controls in Singapore (see Tan and Chen (2000)).
III. An Empirical Model and Data
3.1 Empirical Model
The specific model setup here is to follow Odedokun(1996). Odedokun’s model is based on the standard neoclassical one-sector aggregate production in which financial development constitutes an input. The specification is the following:
Yt = F(Lt , Kt , Ft , Zt ), (1)
where the subscript t refers to time, Y is real output or real GDP, L is labor, K is physical capital, F represents the level of financial development, Z represents other factors associated with economic growth.
By taking differentiation of equation (1), after appropriately manipulating and rearranging equation (1) could be expressed as:
, (2)
where, , , , and represents the economic growth rate, the rate of labor force growth, the investment rate, financial development indicators and other factors, respectively. ut is the error term. Equation (2) is our estimating equation.
In fact, equation (2) can be derived by rewriting equation (1) as the following.
Y=AKaLb , (3)
where, A is the total factor productivity. And expressing in log form, we have
log(Y/L) -a log(K/L) = log A + (a +b-1) log(L)
By assuming that A is positively related to financial deepening and development measured by F, then we have estimated equation (2) (see Park (1992)).
3.2 Data Description and Econometric Method
We use time-series data to test the relationship between financial development and economic growth. Our variables are measured as follows. The growth rate of real GDP is the measure of economic growth. The investment rate is the ratio of fixed-capital investment and GDP. The labor force growth is proxied by employment growth. The variable is calculated as the annual growth rate of employment.
To assess the effect of financial intermediary development on economic growth, three indicators of financial intermediaries development are constructed1. Firstly, we use a broad money stock (M2) to GDP ratio to capture the overall size of the formal financial intermediary sector. This is a typical indicator of financial depth (see King and Levine (1993a)). Secondly, we use private credit, which equals bank claims on the private sector divided by GDP. The measure excludes loans issued to governments and public enterprises. It also excludes credits issued by the central bank. It indicates the share of credit funneled through the private sector. Thirdly, we use commercial-central bank, which equal the ratio of bank domestic assets to total assets of bank and the central bank. It measures the degree to which commercial banks or the central bank allocate the society’s savings (Beck et al. (2000)).
Likewise, to evaluate the effect of stock market development on economic growth, three indicators are constructed. The first indicator is the stock market capitalization ratio, which equals the ratio of the market value of listed shares to GDP. This is a typical measure of stock market size. The second indicator is turnover ratio, which equals the value of the trades of shares on domestic exchanges divided by total value of listed shares. The turnover ratio measures the value of stock transactions relative to the size of the market, and it is frequently used as a measure of market liquidity (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996a, b, c)). The third indicator is the percentage change of stock price index which is the measure of stock market volatility. The deviation of stock price index is measured by the first differences of the average-of-quarter stock market price index.
In addition, to assess the effect of international capital mobility on economic growth, two variables are considered. One variable is capital outflow and GDP ratio, which is defined as the ratio the sum of outward foreign direct investment and portfolio investment assets and GDP. Another variable is capital inflow and GDP ratio, which equals the sum of inward direct investment and portfolio investment liabilities to GDP. Also, we use the inflation rate and the ratio of government consumption to GDP as indicators to measure the macroeconomic stability (Beck et al. (2000)). The inflation rate is defined as the change of CPI. Real export growth was calculated as the annual growth rate of real exports of goods and services. And the growth rate of real export is to capture the degree of openness of an economy.
The Data for Taiwan and Korea are quarterly data over the period from 1981:1 to 2001:3, while only annually data is available for Singapore over the period from 1981 to 2001. The sources of our data are reported in the Appendix.
Since most of the variables under study are likely to be endogenous, the OLS estimators are inconsistent. To overcome the difficulty, we use the generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate the coefficients of the model. One and two-period-lagged dependent and independent variables are used as instruments. All standard errors of estimates are asymptotically autocorrelation and heteroschedascity consistent.
IV. Empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 1 summarizes some of the macroeconomic trends. Korea and Singapore have higher average growth rates with 7.34% and 7.17% respectively. It is usually suggested that investment share of GDP is the engine of economic development. Korea and Singapore have higher average fixed-capital investment to GDP ratio, which were 30.29% and 36.01% respectively. As for the inflation rate, Taiwan and Singapore have maintained a stable price level in 1981-2001. While those measures of M2 to GDP ratio, commercial-central bank, private credit, stock market capitalization ratio, turnover ratio, and the change of stock price index in Taiwan are higher than those in Korea and Singapore. However, the capital outflow to GDP ratio and the capital inflow to GDP ratio in Singapore are higher than those in Taiwan and Korea.
Tables 2-1, 2-2 and 2-3 present correlations between the economic growth rate and financial market development in Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore. As shown in the Tables, the correlations between the economic growth rate and commercial-central bank is only 0.08, while the correlations between the economic growth rate and other financial development indicators are in within the range -0.05 ~ -0.42. In Korea, the correlations between the economic growth rate and stock market capitalization ratio is only 0.12, while the correlations between the economic growth rate and other financial development indicators are within the range -0.04 ~ -0.37. Note that while the correlation between the economic growth rate and both private credit and the change of stock price index are -0.53 and 0.58 respectively in Singapore.
In addition, the correlation between M2 to GDP ratio and both commercial-central bank and private credit in Taiwan and Korea are within the range 0.55 ~ 0.97 and 0.79 ~ 0.82 respectively. While the correlation between M2 to GDP ratio and private credit in Singapore is 0.74. It showed be noted that M2 to GDP ratio can be regarded as liquidity of banks as well as finance-size. Similarly, the correlation between stock market capitalization ratio and turnover ratio is 0.72 in Taiwan, while that in Korea is 0.53. Although these variables are highly correlated over the sample period, while the t-ratios are significant and are stable in Taiwan and Korea. Hence, multicollinearity might not be serious. We include these variables in each of the regressions. But the correlation between M2 to GDP ratio and private credit is 0.74 in Singapore. When we add them in each of the regression, the t-ratios are insignificant. Multicollinearity might be serious in Singapore. Hence, we only include one of them in each of the regression. The correlation between the change rate of stock price index and both stock market capitalization ratio and turnover ratio are 0.10 and -0.04 in Taiwan and 0.0002 and 0.33 in Korea respectively.
In the future study, we will follow Beck et al.(2001) and utilize the multivariate analysis to find out the principal components of the highly correlated financial indicators in the particular category.
4.2 Regression Results
Tables 3-1 through 3-3 report the GMM estimation results for Taiwan, Korea and Singapore respectively. The last row in each table reports p values for the Hansen test which cannot reject the null of overidentitying restrictions. That is, the null hypothesis that the instruments are appropriate cannot be rejected. In addition, all coefficients of inteRCEPt terms were statistically significant which were not reported.
In Tables 3-1 and 3-2, Column (1) considers the economic growth effect of those variables such as the fixed-capital investment to GDP ratio, the employment growth rate, real government consumption as share of real GDP, the growth rate of real export, inflation rate, M2 to GDP ratio, Commercial-Central Bank, Private Credit, stock market capitalization ratio, Turnover ratio, the change of stock price index. Column (2) further includes capital outflow and inflow to GDP ratios. Structural shifts are captured by incorporating intercept dummies for the period of 1987:1-2001:3, 1997:4-1998:4 and 1986:3-1990:4 for Taiwan case and of 1997:1-2001:3, 1997:3-1998:2 and 1986:1-1989:4 in Korea case to capture the structure disturbances in capital mobility liberalization, the Asian Crisis and stock price crash. Hence, Columns (3)~(6) include dummy variables in the capital outflow to GDP ratio, capital inflow to GDP ratio and the percentage change of stock price index respectively. Column (1) in Table 3-3 does not include any dummy variable for Singapore case while is has negative effect in Korea.
These results show that, as expected, all coefficients of employment growth rate and the growth rate of real export were statistically significant. This implies that both the growth rates of employment and real export have contributed to economic growth. And the M2 to GDP ratio variable has a negative and significant effect on economic growth in Taiwan and Korea cases. However, the estimated coefficient of the M2 to GDP ratio is insignificantly negative in Singapore. The private credit plays positive role in Taiwan, this may be due to the relative stability of financial system in Taiwan. As for the fixed-capital investment to GDP ratio, in each country it behaves differently. The estimated coefficient of fixed-capital investment to GDP ratio is significantly positive in Taiwan, while it becomes negative in Korea case and was insignificantly negative in Singapore’s case. One possible reason for these different effects may be due to that the saving rate is higher than the investment rate in both Korea and Singapore cases(see Figure 1-1 and 1-2).
Both the estimated coefficient of capital outflow to GDP ratio and capital inflow to GDP ratio in Column (2) of Tables 3-1 and 3-2 are significant negative. The results reveal that capital outflow and inflow could hurt economic growth in Taiwan and Korea. But, from Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3-3, we found that both capital outflow and capital inflow to GDP ratio coefficients were statistically insignificant in Singapore. One possible reason is that the portfolio investment was larger than direct investment in Taiwan and Korea (see Figure 2-1 through 2-3).
Finally, in Taiwan and Korea, the stock market development had contributed to economic growth. This sharply contrasts with the banking activity, in particular like finance deepening.
V. Conclusions
Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore had experienced rapid economic growth. This paper tries to investigate the source of economic growth in these countries. Particularly we focus on the role of financial development and structure (including banking and stock markets), monetary and financial policies, as well as the degree of international capital mobility in the economic growth processes.
The major findings are the following. (1) High investment has accelerated economic growth in Taiwan. (2) Real export growth rate have contributed to these three economics. (3) The role of foreign capital is ambiguous in promoting Singapore’s economic growth. (4) The capital inflow and outflow have negative effects on Taiwan’s and Korea’s economic growth. (5) M2 to GDP ratio has negative effects on these three economies. One possible reason may be due to financial development imperfections in these countries. (6) While the private credit has positive effect in Taiwan, its effect in Korea is negative. This may be due to the relative sound financial system and prudential financial regulation and supervision in Taiwan comparing with that in Korea. (7) The stock market development has positive effects on economic growth in Korea and Taiwan.
In the next study project, we may combine the principal component analysis and time series analysis to find the relation between financial growth and structure with economic growth. In order to do that, we may categorize the financial indicators into three items, i.e., finance-size and finance-activity.
Appendix - Data Source
The data for this analysis consist of real GDP, real fixed-capital investment, employment, real government consumption, real export of goods and services, consumer price index (CPI), money, quasi-money, bank claims on the private sector by deposit money banks, deposit money bank domestic assets, central bank domestic assets, the total value of listed shares, the value of the trades of shares on domestic exchanges, the stock price index, direct investment abroad, direct investment in domestic, portfolio investment assets, and portfolio investment liabilities. The data for real GDP, real fixed-capital investment, employment, real government consumption, real export of goods and services of Taiwan are from Quarterly National Economic Trends Taiwan Area, the Republic of China, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC. The Korea data is from <http://www.nso.gov.kr/eng>, while the Singapore data is from Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, 1999-2001, Asian Development Bank. The data for employment of Taiwan, Korea and Singapore are from Monthly Bulletin of Manpower Statistics Taiwan Area, Republic of China, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC; <http://www.nso.gov.kr/eng> ; and Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, 1999-2001, Asian Development Bank, respectively.
The data for money, quasi-money, bank claims on the private sector by deposit money banks, the deposit money bank domestic assets, central bank domestic assets, direct investment abroad, direct investment in domestic, portfolio investment assets, and portfolio investment liabilities of Korea and Singapore are all from IMF International Financial Statistics, while those of Taiwan are from Financial Statistics, Taiwan District Republic of China (compiled in accordance with IFS format), Central Bank of China. The CPI data of Korea and Singapore are from IMF International Financial Statistics, while that of Taiwan is from Commodity-Price Statistics Monthly in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC. The data for total value of listed shares, the value of the trades of shares on domestic exchanges, the stock price index of Taiwan and Singapore are from TEJ Data Bank, Taiwan Economic Journal Co. Ltd., and <http://www.nso.gov.kr/eng> respectively. The data of the stock price index of Singapore is from TEJ Data Bank, Taiwan Economic Journal Co. Ltd.
註解
1 See King and Levine(1993a,b), Demetriades and Hussein(1996), Levine(1997) and Beck et al.(2000).
References
Arestis, P., P. O. Demetriades, and K. B. Luintel (2001), “Financial Development and Economic Growth: The Role of Stock Markets,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 33, 16-41.
Barro, R. J. (1991), “Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 408-43.
Beck, T., R. Levine, and N. Loayza (2000), “Finance and the Sources of Growth,” Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 261-300.
Beck, T. A. Demirguc-Kunt, R. Levine, and V. Maksimovic(2001), “Financial Structure and Economic Development: Firm, Industry, and Country Evidence,” in Financial Structure and Economic Growth, eds by Demirguc-Kunt, A. and R. Levine, 1989-241, MIT Press.
Bencivenga, V. R. and B. D. Smith (1991), “Financial Intermediation and Endogenous Growth,” Review of Economic Studies, 58, 195-209.
Bencivenga, V. R., B. D. Smith, and R. M. Starr (1995), “Transactions Costs, Technological Choice, and Endogenous Growth,” Journal of Economic Theory, 67, 153-77.
Demetriades, P. O. and K. A. Hussein (1996), “Does Financial Development Cause Economic Growth? Time-Series Evidence from 16 Countries,” Journal of Development Economics, 51, 387-411.
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and R. Levine (1996a), “Stock Market, Corporate Finance and Economic Growth：An Overview,” The World Bank Economic Review, 10, 229-39.
______(1996b), “Stock Market Development and Financial Intermediaries：Stylized Facts,” The World Bank Economic Review, 10, 291-321.
______(1996c), “The Financial System and Public Enterprise Reform: Concepts and Cases,” in Financial Development and Economic Growth, eds by Neil Hermes and Robert Lensink, 247-286. London:Routledge.
Greenwood, J. and B. Jovanovic (1990), “Financial Development, Growth and the Distribution of Income,” Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1076-1107.
Hanna, D. (2000), “Restructuring Asia’s Financial System,” in The Asian Financial Crisis: Lessons for a Resilient Asia eds. by W. W. Woo, J. D. Sachs and K. Schwab.
Hanson, J. A. (1994), “An Open Capital Account : a Brief Survey of the Issues and the Results,” in Financial Reform : Theory and Experience, G. Caprio, Jr., I. Atiyas, and J. Hanson, eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hsu, C. M. and S. M. Lin (2000), “Financial Development and Endogenous Growth Model," Industry of Free China, 9, 21-47.
Johansen, S. and K. Juselius (1992), “Testing Structural Hypotheses in a Multivariate Cointegration Analysis of PPP and the UIP for UK,” Journal of Econometrics, 53, 211-44.
Johnston, B. R., S. M. Darbar, and C. Echeverria (1997), “Sequencing Capital Account Liberalization: Lessons from the Experiences in Chile, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand,” IMF Working Paper, WP/97/157.
Kim, D. C. and D. Suh (1998), “Financial Liberalization and Korean Corporations’ Financing Policy for Globalization,” Journal of Asian Economics, 9, 31-66.
King, R. G. and R. Levine (1993a), “Finance and Growth：Schumpeter Might be Right,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 717-37.
_____(1993b), “Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth：Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 32, 513-42.
Levine, R.(1991), “Stock Markets, Growth, and Tax Policy,” The Journal of Finance, 46, 1445-65.
_____(1997), “Financial Development and Economic Growth：Views and Agenda,” Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 688-726.
Levine, R. and S. Zervos (1998), “Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth,” American Economic Review, 88, 537-58.
Mckinnon, R. I. (1973), Money and Capital in Economic Development, Washington, D.C.：The Brookings Institution.
Odedokun, M. O. (1996), “Alternative Econometric Approaches for Analysing the Role of the Financial Sector in Economic Growth：Time-Series Evidence from LDCs,” Journal of Development Economics, 50, 119-46.
Park, Y. C. (1992), “Financial Factors in Economic Development Experiences of Korea and Taiwan,” in Conference on Financial Development in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, Oxford University Press.
Saint-Paul, G. (1992), “Technological Choice, Financial Markets and Economic Development,” European Economic Review, 36, 763-81.
Schumpeter, J. A.(1911), The Theory of Economic Development, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Shaw, E. S. (1973), Financial Deepening in Economic Development, New York：Oxford University Press.
Smith, H. (2000), “The State, Banking and Corporate Relationships in Korea and Taiwan,” in Drysdale, Peter eds., Reform and Recovery in East Asia ¾The Role of the State and Economic Enterprise, Routled GE: London, 59-98.
|
||||||
|
||||||
|
||||
